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I.—PROBLEMS IN GREEK SYNTAX.

III.

From moods and modal particles we pass over to the tenses and consider first those temporal relations that are common to all the moods, the so-called *status actionis* or kind of time, that which makes *δίδου* to differ from *δός*, *ἦν διδῶ* from *ἦν δῶ*, *διδοίης* from *δοίης*, *διδόναι* from *δοῦναι*, *διδούς* from *δούς*, as well as *ἐδίδομεν* from *ἔδομεν*. For these are the universal relations and, which is especially important, these were the relations to which the Greeks were sensitive from the beginning to the end, so sensitive that experienced Grecians have acknowledged their inferiority in this regard to the poorest *Graeculi*.¹ What the original scheme of the tenses was need not trouble us here. The categories of past, present and future to which we cling despite our own language, which has no future, these categories are not vital. Out of durative or

¹ Blass, G. N. T. G., § 57, 'This distinction is observed in the N. T. with the same accuracy as in classical Greek.' Cf. A. J. P. XI 107. On the other hand, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Lesebuch*, Erl., p. 215, says: Der Unterschied zwischen den Imperativen des Praesens und des Aorists wird in der vulgären Rede vernachlässigt. On the domination of the aor. imper. in certain spheres see my remarks on Justin Martyr, *Apol.* I 16, 6. Doubtless the problem is often a very delicate one, as in Eur. Hipp. 473: ἀλλ' ὦ φίλη παῖ, λῆγε μὲν κακῶν φρενῶν, | λῆξον δ' ὑβρίζουσ'· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο πλὴν ὑβρις | τὰδ' ἐστί. Is this change a mere matter of *metri causa*? Or, to use the consecrated formula, does *λῆγε* give a general and *λῆξον* a specific command, the specification being made by *ὑβρις τὰδ' ἐστί*, or does *λῆγε* connote impatience (S. C. G. § 405) as the aorist connotes urgency?

progressive, out of aoristic, ingressive, complexive, completed action, one can get by combination temporal relations enough to satisfy life.¹ And yet respectable scholars, more than respectable scholars, have slighted or sneered at the *status actionis* of the extra-indicative moods, and, whilst they accept and expand the traditional differences between ἔφευγον and ἔφυγον, pass over lightly or ignore the difference between φεύγειν and φυγεῖν. Of course, this is a sad inconsistency, because ἔφευγον differs from ἔφυγον only as φεύγειν differs from φυγεῖν. But, of late years, a disposition has been shown to efface this inconsistency also, and the differences between imperfect and aorist have been wiped out by various scholars, notably by one from whose native familiarity with two distinct preterites one would have expected a different attitude.² But the French *prétérit défini* is a book tense, and the French imperfect, while it helps us to understand the Greek imperfect, helps us also to misunderstand it. In fact, there are few domains in which national variations are so puzzling as in that of the tenses. With all the practice of long residence and all the advantages of hard study the foreigner bewrays himself by the tenses. This is true of the German in America, of the American in Germany. This was true of the Roman writer of Greek, and the use of the tenses is one of the marks by which the Latinizing writer of Greek is detected. Too many pluperfects, too few imperfects.³ But just now we are dealing not so much with the past-imperfect and the past-aorist as with the imperfect in general and the aorist in general, the progressive tenses and the aoristic tenses.⁴ True, the differences are often hard to translate, sometimes impossible of translation. But what concerns us here is the direct perception of the differences between such temporal relations, not the difficulty of rendering these differences into an alien tongue. We may resort to special periphrases, we may use auxiliary verbs to bring out the distinctions, we may even go as far as Curtius has done and make use of different verbs for different tenses, just as in Greek itself ἤλθον is the practical aorist of εἶμι and ἐπάταξα the practical aorist of τύπτω.

¹ See A. J. P. XXIII 106.

² Riemann in the *Mélanges Graux*, 585-598. See now Riemann and Goelzer, p. 250 and p. 832.

³ A. J. P. XIV 104; XVI 259.

⁴ For which I have recently proposed the terms 'paratatic' and 'apobatic', A. J. P. XXIII 106.

All that interests us here is the establishment of the fact of the feeling. Once the feeling was almost universally admitted, but objections have not been wanting. There is the *metri causa* argument, to show that the distinction, if any, is overborne by the march of the verse. There is the parallel passage argument, the argument that has been used triumphantly to show that there is no difference between this future and that future. If one admits that *metri causa* may suffice to efface slight differences, the inch of concession becomes an ell whereby to measure all Greek. If one attempts to show that two passages may have the same general meaning and yet a very different coloring, one cannot expect a patient hearing from those who think that it is very much the same thing whether you use two finite verbs or one finite verb and one participle.¹ But in spite of all cavil there are passages in which the Greek author himself makes a point that turns on the shift of the tenses, and to these we can look with confidence as proofs that the distinction is not dead. It is at most dormant. It can be roused to life whenever needed. And if this is so, the style of an author will be very different according as these modal tenses are always used sharply and clearly, or as he slurs distinctions which must have been national.

Not least interesting nor least convincing in this range of studies are the fixed formulae; for in these formulae we have the record of distinctions that must have been sharply marked to the early speakers of the language. What may seem subtle to us could not have been subtle, to begin with. Such a formula is the coincidence of the kind of time in *φθάνω* and its participle. It is a regular paradigm, *φθάνω ποιῶν*, *φθάνω* (hist. pres.) *ποιήσας*, *φθήσομαι ποιήσας*, *ἔφθασα ποιήσας*, *παύ—ἔφθακα πεποιηκώς*. *φθάνω* and the participle are, if not absolutely faithful to each other, at least reasonably so through all generations of Greek. It is an example of conjugal fidelity worthy of all admiration.² The participle of *λανθάνω* is not so constant and the participle of *τυγχάνω* is as inconstant as *τύχη* herself.

In studying the tenses of a foreign language it is especially desirable to get rid of one's native ply; and yet, as it is impossible to get rid of it, the next best thing is to make allowances for it. So in studying the Greek present we must

¹ For Homeric examples see T. D. Seymour, Transactions of American Philological Association, XII 81.

² See A. J. P. XII 78-9.

remember that we have two familiar periphrases for the present for which the Greek has no exact parallels, the so-called progressive 'I am walking', which is not adequately rendered by βαδίζων εἰμί, and 'I do walk', which produces an impression akin to βαδίζω δῆ. We are prone, therefore, to analyze the Greek present as we are usually forced to analyze the Greek future, as we are forced to decide between the periphrastic 'shall' and 'will'. To the Greek the present was an indefinite tense. In familiar language it answered for present, it answered for past, it answered for future. It is universal: 'The sun rises in the East and sets in the West'. It is particular: 'The sun sets behind a cloud'. And this suffices. But we cannot help asking: Is it originally progressive or, if you choose, durative? Is it originally aoristic? Or, have we one set of forms that are progressive, one that are aoristic? Was there, for instance, the same difference between a long present form and a short present form that we feel between ἀγυνέω and ἄγω? All that can be said with approximate confidence is that a typical difference having set itself up between imperfect and aorist in certain forms, the present associated itself with the imperfect and became by preference durative, by preference progressive. When, therefore, an aoristic present was needed, the aorist itself was employed. We who have learned to feel the augment as the sign of the past time may have our sensibilities shocked, but we have to unlearn that feeling; and in any case the fact is there, and it is impossible to explain all the uses of the aorist side by side with the present by a resort to the paradigmatic aorist or to the empiric aorist. It is an interesting phenomenon that the so-called gnomic aorist holds to its augment in Homer with a tenacity that is very strange in view of the fact that gnomic aorist and present are so often paralleled.¹ True, the paradigmatic aorist has its legitimate use in proverbs, which are largely abridged parables, abridged stories. A typical action is good for all time. The empiric aorist appeals to experience as the Preacher appeals to experience. 'The thing that hath been it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun'. But the

¹ Platt, E. J. of Phil. XIX (1891): 'The general rule is that the gnomic aorist in old Epic poetry takes the augment. Exceptions are so few as to be practically non-existent'.

paradigmatic and the empiric explanations do not satisfy the feeling in passages in which the shift from present to aorist is clearly a shift from durative to complexive, from progress to finality, and it is just these passages that show how alive the Greek is to the kind of time.¹ If the Greek had used throughout his literature the historical present for the past, the aoristic feeling of the present might have been more pronounced, but the historical present, belonging as it does to the household stock, seems to have been tabooed as vulgar by the epic and the higher lyric.² There is not an example in Homer, and I have challenged all that have been cited in Pindar (I. E., cii). It was the drama, which is chiefly representative and not narrative, that ventured to bring it back. Once rehabilitated by the drama, it became common in prose and was used freely by historians and orators, not, however, without individual differences, which it might be worth while to scan more narrowly, but it was never, perhaps, employed so recklessly as among the Romans, who are sadly given to overdoing. In English the historical present is in like manner apt to be overdone by flashy writers, and is not unfrequently sought by those who wish to be lively at all hazards. The historical present is a well-known weakness of Dickens. As Augustine Birrell says, 'What can be drearier than when a plain, matter-of-fact writer attempts to be animated and tries to make his characters live by the futile but easy expedient of writing about them in the present tense?' As a future the present is used only in those verbs in which the will is the deed. There are very few. Nor does the present for the future show itself much in the Greek dependent sentence, whereas it reigns in idiomatic English. The Greek absolutely riots in futures of every shade and seldom calls on the *praesens propheticum*, which is reserved for solemn occasions. We are in the region of 'Burdens' and 'Warnings'. 'Behold, the Lord maketh the earth empty and maketh it waste and turneth it upside down'.

¹ The passages in my S. C. G. § 260 might have been multiplied, perhaps ought to have been multiplied. The aorist produces an effect of finality akin to the perfect, of which the aorist is often the shorthand. In S. C. G. § 257, which has been freely criticised, read, 'the gnomic perfect < is based > on experience < real or imaginary (vision) >'.

² See now S. C. G., § 200, and cf. Kellner, Historical Outlines of English Syntax, p. 229: 'The Historical Present is scarcely to be met with in Old English; but there are numerous instances of it from the thirteenth century down to our times. Frequent in Chaucer and Elizabethan writers'.

The Greek future is, for us, as has been intimated, an untranslatable tense. In every simple sentence we are obliged to differentiate and as the use of 'will' and 'shall' has varied greatly from the time of Shakespeare to our own days and still varies in different localities, the difficulty of rendering is greatly enhanced. But the translation should not be allowed to get between us and the Greek future. We encounter a like puzzle in every direction, we encounter it in the Latin future, in the Romance future, which no native analyzes into 'will' and 'shall'. In the leading clause the negative is *οὐ*, but in the dependent clause with the exception of the descriptive relative the negative is *μὴ*. In the one it is indicative, in the other it is, for want of a better word, imperative. Now according to Dr. Rutherford, who is a Scotchman, the future indicative in an *εἰ*-clause is to be translated by an emphatic 'will',¹ but I am not certain that I always understand a Scotchman's 'will'; and the American 'will' is not uniform. 'We will' for 'we shall' is exceedingly common over the whole country and is not a specifically Southern error, as has been charged: and even those who make the book difference between 'shall' and 'will' are apt to lean too much to 'shall' and others who manage to keep 'shall' and 'will' apart in statement are prone to fuse them in the question and in indirect discourse and, then again, those who are decent enough in the matter of 'shall' and 'will' are reckless in the matter of 'should' and 'would', to which the same principles apply. I should therefore prefer not to accept Dr. Rutherford's uniform translation of an emphatic 'will' for *εἰ* with future indicative and yet it is but fair to say that the 'shall' by which we are prone to render *εἰ* with future indicative in contradistinction to *ἐάν* with the subjunctive seems to be more formal, minatory, legal in its tone now than it was centuries ago. Let us, therefore, put translations aside for a while and say: It is enough if we associate the imperative idea with the *μὴ* future of the dependent clause. In the independent sentence there is no *μὴ* future. There the negative is *οὐ* and the so-called imperative future with *οὐ* is not an imperative but a familiar prediction, which involves either absolute control or foreknowledge absolute. It is the address to a slave, to a familiar, and all the mildness of its imperative use is the merest fancy. 'Thou shalt not steal' is not the rendering of the Greek *οὐ κλέψεις*. The Hebrew has the negative of prediction. The command is addressed to the servant of the Most High.

¹ First Greek Syntax § 285.

The Greek future does not escape the question of its modality nor does it escape the question as to the kind of its time. Is it undifferentiated or does it lean toward progressive action on the one hand or toward complexive action on the other? The close resemblance in form—I waive all questions of origin here as elsewhere—the close resemblance in form to the first aorist subjunctive may have given it a ply in the aoristic direction and a remarkable indication of that is the steadiness of *φθάσω* (*φθήσομαι*) with the aorist participle, but whatever its natural affinities, the Greek prefers other expressions than the future indicative for more exact relations of future time. The future indicative has, it is true, established itself in the independent sentence but in the dependent sentence it is confined to a limited sphere from which it has not succeeded in ousting the more exact expressions of temporal relations such as *ὅταν* and *ἐπειδάν* with present and aorist subjunctive. It has not forced its way into temporal sentences of limit such as *ἕως ἄν* and *πρὶν ἄν*. *ἦν* with present and aorist subjunctive outnumbers *εἰ* with future indicative and the generic relative prefers *ὅς ἄν* with present and aorist subjunctive. Nay, even in the leading clause, the optative with *ἄν* disputes the territory with the future, and the positive future is balanced by the negative optative with *ἄν*. This desire for an exact future is characteristic of the language and gives rise to complicated periphrases, but nowhere is it shown more strikingly than in the exactness with which the comparatively late first future passive is used whenever there are two competing forms. In the *De Compositione* Dionysios bids us consider whether we shall use *ἀφαιρήσομαι* or *ἀφαιρεθήσομαι*,¹ but Dionysios is thinking of the rhythmical effect merely. The modern grammarian is thinking of the kind of time. *ἀφαιρήσομαι* is durative and may be compared with the verbs of depriving, *ἀφαιρεθήσομαι* is aoristic; and the conviction of the justice of this distinction caused Blass to revise his scheme of the tenses in the new edition of Kühner, as is well known.² We see then that the survival of the original modal sense of the future, the range of its employment as an imperative, the replacement of it by other moods, all these belong to aesthetic syntax as well as to every-day syntax: and so does the use of the future as a gnomic

¹ De comp. verb. 43 (R): καὶ ἀφαιρήσομαι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀφαιρεθήσομαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . μετασκενάζει τὰς λέξεις ἵνα αὐτῷ γένοιτο ἀρμοσθεῖσαι καλλίους καὶ ἐπιτηδεύτεραι.

² Cf. Teil I., Bd. II., S. 585 with Bd. I., §190.

tense, so does the traveller's future of Herodotos, by which the story-teller enters into confidential relations with his listener.

The future perfect has little range in Greek. It is a rare form. Grammarians tell us that it is not formed from pure verbs that begin with a vowel. If one chooses to consider *ᾠφελήσομαι* a future perfect what is there to prevent it? And the context might demand it. In its narrow range the future perfect has its full rights. There is no abatement of its force in *δεδήσομαι* or *πεπράσομαι* any more than there is an abatement in the force of the perfect imperative. *εἰρήσεται* has the same sphere as *εἰρήσθω*.¹ That the future perfect occurs chiefly in the dramatic poets is due not to the iambic metre at the close of the verse, as has been maintained. That is a mere coincidence of position with sense. Where else shall we look for finality if we are not to look for it in the future perfect and at the end of the verse? When Aias says: *τὰ . . . τεύχη κοῖν' ἐμοὶ τεθάψεται*, who would dare to write *ταθήσεται*, no matter how the metrical Moloch might smile with its iron jaws?

To the sphere of the present belongs the perfect. Everybody recognizes now that in the perfect form, as elsewhere, reduplication, has only to do with the character of the action, that we have to make a variety of classes, that we have to sunder f. i. the onomatopoetic perfect and the emotional perfect from the perfect of completion. And yet it is not so very many years since 'I have set up a yell and therefore am yelling' was gravely put forward as an explanation of the tense of *κέκραγα*. Few would venture nowadays to explain *τέρριγα* and *δέδια* as perfects of completed action. Verbs of perception, verbs of gesture have passed into the intensive category, not always with so clear a right. Of course the large use of such perfects is to be sought in the poetical sphere—which is the sphere of fancy and emotion and need not detain us—but a word as to the sphere of the ordinary perfect may not be amiss.

In practical life the perfect was much more frequently used than we might gather from a general survey of the literature; and in fact, the nearness of any department of literature to practical life may readily be measured by the perfect. The perfect belongs to the drama, to the orators, to the dialogues of Plato. The drama, to be sure, is under the thrall of verse and the perfect is a heavy form and suffers a replacement by the aorist; and yet it is of not infrequent occurrence. In history the perfect has no place outside

¹ See A. J. P. XVII 518 and S. C. G. § 279 foll.

of the speeches and the reflective passages in which the author has his say. One would hardly expect a dearth of perfects in an author like Polybios, head of the pragmatistical school of historians. Statistics are a bugbear to many, and perhaps the statistics of the perfect would not be profitable. In the absence of statistics, turn over the leaves of Veitch's *Irregular Verbs* and see in what authors perfects most do congregate. I have just alluded to the replacement of the perfect by the aorist, which, as I have said elsewhere, may be used as the shorthand of the perfect (A. J. P. XIV 105). The aorist has a strong affinity for the negative and we often find the tenses so associated that the negative thought is expressed by the aorist, the positive by the perfect. Then whole ranges of verbs form no perfect that we know of, and many of the perfects that figure in our grammars are due to the mechanical manufacture of an artificial period, to the desire of completing a paradigm such as gave birth to the various unrealities that were wont to figure under ΤΥΠΤΩ, though in view of the fact that even in the best period there are so many isolated perfects, we ought not to be too hasty in damning the *Graeculi*, whom it is so easy to damn.

In consideration, then, of all these cross-calculations it will be admitted that the stylistic study of the use of the perfect is a complicated problem and perhaps all that can be formulated with certainty is that the very large use of the perfect in any sphere shows too much analysis and is a mark of decline, and in later Greek suggests Roman influence—the same influence that manifests itself in an undue use of the pluperfect.

The three historical tenses were used with full consciousness by the Greeks of the best period, by the Greek of the period in which imagination and reflection held perfect balance; and the distinction between imperfect and aorist and the distinction between aorist and pluperfect play a large part in syntax and yet not too large a part. The formulae are too vague, the observations too superficial; too little attention has been paid to the sphere of usage, so that assaults on the traditional distinctions are not surprising. These assaults have had for their object mainly the levelling of imperfect and aorist; for the difference between aorist and pluperfect is too evident to be ignored. Indeed, if we study the passages in which the Greek makes a point on the shifting use of the three historical tenses, it does not readily appear how any student of the Greek language who has to deal with practical phenomena could allow a theory of origin

to interfere with the facts of usage. There might be room for carping when the three historical tenses as used in the same sentence come from different verbs, but what is to be done with the classic passage in Herodotos, in which the same verb is used, the tense shifting as if the historian were giving a lesson in grammar.¹ The difference thus made is the typical difference, which may be obscured here and there, which can never be effaced. Much has been made of a small and ancient group of verbs in which we have indifferent preterites—*ἦν, ἦα, ἔφην*—though even these are not indifferent throughout, and let us frankly say that for aught we know the group may have been much larger. Nay, it may be conceded that the whole difference between aorist and imperfect is in all likelihood the result of a gradual differentiation. *ἔτραπον* the aorist of one dialect is the imperfect of another. But the differentiation is there. Just as in another sphere we say that whatever *ἑστεφανώσατο* may have been in the beginning, it becomes rigidly middle, so it may safely be said that an imperfect in the classic language is never interchangeable with the aorist, though the shift from one to the other is often so subtle as to escape our analysis, and we have to resort to the imponderable category of 'feeling'. The best contrasted definitions do not avail throughout. We call the aorist the tense of statement, the imperfect the tense of description; we call the aorist the complexive tense, the imperfect the tense of evolution. We say that the aorist gives the sum, the imperfect the items. We say that the imperfect is the tense of actual vision, the tense of sympathy. The aorist appeals more to the intellect, the imperfect more to the eye. The aorist descends like lightning, the imperfect comes down like a pall. There is an aorist of eagerness, an imperfect of reluctance; and so on through a long array of metaphors. And yet a simple *ἔλεγε* where one might use *εἶπε* drives Cobet to set up a peculiarity of the Ionic dialect, and his fine remark on the propriety of the imperfect for the *oculati testes* (N. L. 409) is wasted on himself. *ἔπεμπον, ἐκέλευον, ἔλειπον* have evoked a variety of explanations.² The artistic imperfect *ἐπόλει* seems to have puzzled

¹ See now S. C. G., § 264.

² The aorist of eagerness is the so-called dramatic aorist which figures in all the grammars (S. C. G., § 262), but I did not have the heart to add another category to my exhibit of the imperfect in spite of my own note on Pindar, O. 6, 45: *ἔλειπε*, 'She had to leave'. Cf. Il. 19, 288, and Eur. H. F. 554, with the note of Wilamowitz.

the ancients themselves, and the almost sentimental explanation that we find in Pliny has been accepted with rapture and cited over and over again as an illustration of the modesty of the Greek artist, who lingered lovingly over his work and never counted himself to have attained, until some pitiless statistician found out that the early artists had no such sentimentality, and now the prosaic explanation which parallels *ἐποίησεν* with *ἐποίησε*, 'was the maker' with 'was the mother', has thrust out the other.¹ And yet the other may have been superinduced. The artists of modern times who have accepted Pliny's explanation, and have inscribed on their work *faciebat* in good faith, must have had partners in their error among the antique artists, for Pliny's contribution to the theory of the tenses was doubtless a tradition of the studio. Nay, even Pindar lends color to the tradition when he sings: αἰλῶν τεύχε (sc. παρθένος) πάμφωνον μέλος, where we see the Virgin Goddess fashioning the melody. But the aorist follows, εὗρεν θεός. (P. 12, 19.)

In the list of traditional differences between aorist and imperfect given above, the reader may miss the formulae of 'prolonged' and 'momentary' action. Few formulae have done more harm than these. Tense of duration, tense of momentum, would not be so objectionable, but, unfortunately, duration has to be explained and the seat of the duration put where it belongs, in the eye of the beholder, in the heart of the sympathizer, and not in the action itself. Describe a rapid action and you have the imperfect. Sum up a long action and you have the aorist. Definite numbers take the aorist with a fateful regularity, if there is no interruption to the series.² The negative takes the aorist as a rule, the imperfect only when there is something countervailing, something that has to be opposed, so that the negative with the imperfect often gets a modal translation, just as we say in English 'The door would not shut'. So in Latin the historical tenses of verbs of hindering are limited to the imperfect sequence. Hindering involves opposition to will, involves resistance to pressure.

¹ See S. C. G., § 213, footnote. Ulrich's remark occurs in his *Chrestomathia Pliniana*, Einleitung, XIV. Add Meisterhans³, p. 241.

² So in any kind of Greek that is Greek, Hebrews 3, 17: τίσιν δὲ προσώχθισεν τεσσεράκοντα ἔτη. The catena can easily be effected and in my *Syntax* § 244 I did not care to multiply examples, which any index that has numerals in it will increase indefinitely. Examples with the non-indicative moods, however, are not so common, and I am sorry that I did not cite Dem. 50, 39: τὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ χρόνον τριηράρχησον τοὺς ἐξ ἡμῶν.

Much can be done in the way of observing the spheres in which the imperfect moves, the verbs that it prefers, and analysis has not exhausted its resources, though, of course, much will always be left to immediate feeling and Queen Grammar will lose her rights. In shifting from one language to another, one has to acquire a different set of tentacles. As a tense *ἔλεγεν*, 'dicebat', 'disait', 'said', 'sagte' may be called by the same name and may have the same function and yet demand a different treatment. Our English imperfect has collapsed into an aorist, so much so that the progressive is used when we need certain phases of the imperfect, and yet the aoristic use of our imperfect is in need of reinforcement, and when we use the negative, which has affinities with the aorist, we use the reduplicated aorist 'did'. Nay, we Americans shocked the late Mr. Fitzedward Hall by going so far as to say 'did not have', which, I am ready to believe, is abominable. In South Germany the imperfect is less used; and in French the imperfect is used in a way that seems to be nearer to Greek than it is to Latin. There are no statistics to show what is the proportion of imperfect to aorist in Greek compared with the proportion of imperfect to historical perfect in Latin. It has been maintained of late on the basis of a very imperfect induction that the Roman did not use his imperfect so freely as did the Greek, and it is *a priori* very likely, but the conditions are so complicated that mere counting will not suffice. To plunge into Caesar's Gallic War and Xenophon's Anabasis and emerge with a bushel-basket of statistics will not serve. The spheres are not exactly the same, and oh! the difference of authors, apart from the nationality.¹ The large use of the imperfect in Greek may, however, well be considered a note of *naïveté*, but that note of *naïveté* is lost in the transfer to English, to German. The English progressive would be intolerable for any length of time and is excluded from a certain range of verbs. 'I was loving' of our paradigms is an impossibility. The German imperfect does not produce the same impression as the Greek imperfect, and as the South German is more *naïf* than the North German, one might have to substitute the perfect and save the tone at the expense of the tense. Here, then, on what some would consider the very threshold of the language, we meet a problem that is to be solved by sympathy and sympathy alone. The open sense of the student is the only open sesame.

¹A. J. P. XIV 105.

The pluperfect, which figures so largely in Latin, has a much more modest rôle in Greek. It is made up in very much the same way, but it is a relatively heavier form, and the notion of antecedence in the past which gives the Latin pluperfect so wide a scope is jauntily borne in Greek by the aorist. The aorist is not so exact as it might be; but the Greeks were satisfied with a hint. The Greek pluperfect is to the imperfect what the perfect is to the present. It hunts in couples with the imperfect and aorist, and should be studied in connexion with its comrades. But it is a lumbering tense and requires more analysis of the situation than the Greeks were disposed to wait for. Hence there is no more suspicious circumstance in later Greek than the abounding use of the pluperfect; and the multiplication of the pluperfect in Babrius gives the effect of a translation from the Latin, though even that does not avail to destroy the charm.

THE COMPOUND SENTENCE.

We now pass from the domain of the simple sentence to that of the compound sentence, from the combination of words to the combination of sentences, now in parataxis, now in hypotaxis. In the older grammars parataxis received scant notice. A few remarks on the copulative, adversative, causal and illative conjunctions, and then the attention was concentrated chiefly on hypotaxis with its more complicated phenomena. Nowadays parataxis is looked upon as the key to hypotaxis. All subordination is traced to co-ordination and the first question in regard to every hypotactic phenomenon is: How did it originate in parataxis? The value of the method is undoubted, and it is true that many of the most difficult problems in the syntax of the sentence find their ultimate explanation in the original parataxis. But no sooner was the key found than it was forced into locks which it could by no means be made to fit, and warning voices were not long in making themselves heard, Brugmann's most emphatically (A. J. P. IV 418, 419). The processes of the lover of language ought not to be brutal.

τὸν δὲ Κένταυρος ζαμενής, ἀγανᾶ χλαρὸν γελάσσαις ὀφρύι, μῆτιν ἔαν
εὐθύς ἀμείβετο * Κρυπταὶ κλαῖδες ἐντὶ σοφᾶς Πειθοῦς ἱερᾶν φιλοτάτων.

Pyth. 9, 38.

Analysis must imitate the coaxing process of synthesis. Valuable as it is in enabling us to understand origins, the paratactic formula

rudely applied has wrought positive mischief. We must not insist on forcing it to the front, we must not insist on feeling it under formulae that were established as formulae, that had established other formulae long before our record. 'Do ye not know that the saints shall judge the world?' (I Cor. 6, 1), may be analyzed thus: 'The saints shall judge the world'—'do you not know that?' but analysis fails to reproduce the effect of the synthesis—fails to explain the synthesis. The change of order alone is fatal to such a genesis. The matter is not so simple as it seems. And so in Greek, as Brugmann has pointed out, while certain sentences may be explained paratactically they are not felt paratactically. True, we never lose the negative feeling of μή, the conflict of negatives in μή οὐ, and *ut* after a Latin verb of fear has a way of its own with it¹ and is not felt as an equivalent of *ne non*. There is therefore a manner of survival of parataxis in sentences of fear, though only a manner of survival; but the final sentence which ultimately belongs to the same group had passed into the stage of formula before our record. Emotion may revive the original parataxis with verbs of fear. Purpose is too closely welded to permit the revival of parataxis. The final sentence is ultimately an imperative sentence and we should expect the tenses to run on the same lines as the imperative tenses, but with all the work Weber has done on the final sentence, this is a point that he has not wrought out and it is worth working out. But however that may be, the shifting conjunctions color the finality somewhat. The Homeric ὡς is 'how', and so is ὅπως, and we feel *κεν* when it attaches itself to these, we feel *ἄν*. In

ἀλλ' ἴθι, μή μ' ἐρέθιζε, σαώτερος ὧς κε νέηαι

the little *κε* is heard amid the outburst of rage; the subtle touch is lost in *oratio obliqua*. In Plato's prose rendering we have simply the optative: ἀπιέναι δ' ἐκέλευε καὶ μὴ ἐρεθίζειν ἵνα σὼς οἴκαδε ἔλθοι.² ὅφρα 'until' is dying as 'until'. In the *Odyssey* it is largely 'in order that'. In *Pindar* it is only 'in order that', in fact, is nothing more than a bit of poetical obsolescence, and the 'in order that' of ἵνα is as early as the time of *Homer* dissociated from the 'where' of ἵνα, which survives only in out-of-the-way corners of speech until the artificial writers of late centuries fished it up as *Attic* and made it do duty as 'where' at the same time that they

¹ A. J. P. VI 84.

² Rpb. 393 E.

rehabilitated $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$. How far the final sentence had become formula, how far it was going on the way already traversed by the other final, the infinitive, we can see by the occasional use of a final sentence as a complementary sentence of design¹ such as are familiar in Latin, *impero ut* and the like. But by one of those pudencies to which language is subject, the process did not go forward along the whole line and, while we find such constructions with the semi-final conjunctions $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ and $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$ even in the best period, the shamelessness of $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ and the subjunctive does not become rampant until a late period, until in fact the Orontes had disembogued into the Tiber as the Tiber had absorbed the Ilissus. In the modern language the infinitive has disappeared and $\nu\acute{\alpha}$ with the subjunctive reigns in its stead.

It is clear, then, that if we find the reign of formula in the dependent sentence so well established from the beginning of our record as to anticipate the corruption of later times, it is idle to lay too much stress on primitive conditions. And yet the primitive conditions are not to be neglected especially when they survive in languages to which we can apply the test of direct appreciation, and for the evolution of the subordinate clause our own language gives us unusual opportunities. In the whole matter of the genesis of dependent sentences, the relative plays an important part and for the state of things that preceded the relative we have valuable survivals in English. For like the English stock, the English language has retained much that is primitive and few cultured languages show more clearly the process of growth. The Cyclopean structure of the sentence is found more familiarly in English than elsewhere and we go back to a period that antedates the relative. 'The man I saw', 'I fear he knows', 'I hope he sees', which run trippingly off our tongues, would be strange in other languages. In Shakespeare's time the freedom was much greater. Now we limit the usage to the objective relatives proper but, as it is, the bounds are wide enough to make a foreigner stare. 'The man that I saw', 'the man which I saw' 'the man whom I saw' represent different states and stages. 'The man I saw' is primal.²

Now the relative owes its main binding force to its position at the head of a sentence. To use Greek terminology, it would not have become an $\acute{\alpha}\rho\theta\rho\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\omicron\sigma\alpha\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu$, if it had not been so

¹ See Monro, H. G. § 286.

² See Kellner l. c. § 109.

decidedly an ἄρθρον προτακτικόν. The demonstrative οὗτος at the head of a sentence has exactly the same office, and we cannot speak of asyndeton when οὗτος is employed with reference to what precedes. It is the antecedent as we call it, the correlative of the relative, οὗτος—ὅς, ὅς—οὗτος.

From sentences thus connected by ἀναφορά arises what is called hypotaxis, what is called subordination. It is younger, we say, less primitive than co-ordination and absence of it gives simplicity, gives *naïveté* to style. And yet so old is it that some familiar forms of parataxis might be classed as hypotaxis. Whatever may be thought of καί, τε—καί and τε—τε are as hypotactic as τοσοῦτον—ὅσον.

Position and correlation are, as we have seen, the great factors in the building up of the hypotactic sentence. Correlation grows by position and never can dispense with position, whereas position can dispense with correlation. You can use ὅς alone, but as soon as you have the so-called antecedent you must put it where it will be felt. The shifting of the position is technically called hyperbaton and this hyperbaton or overleaping is possible only by a return to the primitive life of the language. The hyperbaton of the relative is a return to the demonstrative in Greek, to the interrogative in Latin. Separate the article, when it has become an article, from its substantive and the demonstrative nature comes back.

Position enables us to dispense with correlation it is true, but the expression of correlation is not a matter of indifference. The correlative style is more deliberate, better balanced, and the Greek loves balance, so that correlatives hold their own whereas the single element dies out. τε—τε, nay, for that matter, οὐτε—τε, μήτε—τε are more common than τε *solitarium*. We can gauge an author's style by his use of πρότερον—πρίν; and the expression of the correlative of ὥστε gives a certain grave deliberateness which the flippant afterthought ὥστε has not.¹ The absence of a regular correlative to the final sentence, to the conditional sentence, must also be taken into consideration when the effect as well as the genesis of these combinations is to be studied. The temporal sentence indulges freely in correlation but some forms avoid it. τέως—ἔως is as formal as a lawsuit, and the two are

¹ A. J. P. XIV 241. The correlative use of ὥστε and consequent stylistic effect has recently been elaborated in a special J. H. U. dissertation by W. A. Eckels: 'Ὡστε as an Index of Style in the <Attic> Orators.

seldom seen together. Hence a certain masquerading *τέως* is sometimes used as *ζως*, and *τέως* not unfrequently has an indefinite use. If *ἄν* had been blessed with a correlative, we should have less trouble with a particle which behaves as *τέως* behaves—now definite, now indefinite.

So important is the relative in the organization of the dependent sentence that all hypotactic sentences have been considered in some sort relative sentences, as each class of sentences is introduced by relative or, which is the same thing, demonstrative particles. The conditional *εἰ* is, according to some scholars, a manner of relative, and in explaining the anomalous intruder, *πρίν*, recourse has been had to *ἤ*, which has also been considered a relative. But the relative sentence has a life of its own, and the parallels so frequent between the relative sentence and the other forms often do harm. *ὅς ἄν* does not go the whole way with *ἐάν*. The final relative sentence is put in the future indicative, not in the subjunctive. Each class of sentences gets habits of its own, and the deviation from these habits gives variety, gives undulation to style, variety and undulation which cannot be appreciated unless there be a norm. Long familiarity with the trim garden of Attic syntax is a necessary preliminary to the enjoyment of the luxuriance of Homeric syntax. Only one must be careful to do justice to the luxuriance and not deny law because the phyllotaxy is not at once apparent.

The subdivision of hypotactic sentences into the various familiar categories has undeniable practical advantages and is not lightly to be given up, though all logical categories are open to suspicion. But so far as I am aware, no one has made a careful study of the proportion of these classes in different authors. Inside the different classes something has been done, but one would like to know which author leans to the final, which to the conditional, which prefers the participle, which the object sentence. In this whole line of research only beginnings have been made. So we know that in Aischylos the conditional sentence is rare in comparison with Euripides. It is an epitome of the difference between the two great poets, between the gravity of the Areiopagos and the mobility of the Heliaia. The relative sentence is less analytic than the final, than the temporal, the participle than all these. And under the different classes of sentences what variety of usage, what interesting coincidences of usage. Pindar and Aischylos, so alike and yet so different, make

kindred use of the logical conditional. It is a severe note that is not to be disregarded. It is a sharp line of Kalamis. Under the head of the temporal sentence it has been noted that $\xi\omega\varsigma$ encroaches on $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ and actually steals some of $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$'s peculiar territory, until familiar $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon}\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ — $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ is replaced by $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon}\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ — $\xi\omega\varsigma$. What is that but the encroachment of the reflective on the naïve, just as the growing use of *naïf* for naïve is a token of the encroachment of the reflective on the *naïf* naïve? $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ is equivalent to $\xi\omega\varsigma$ only by inference. $\xi\omega\varsigma$ itself is more accurate, more prosaic. One can almost hear the voice of some ancient pedant saying as Whitelaw has said, ' $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ can never be $\xi\omega\varsigma$ '. No! but it connotes $\xi\omega\varsigma$ and if it were not for connotation where would many scholars be? The tendency to simplification, which we notice in the healthy language, is accelerated in the decline. As the pure subjunctive of the conditional sentence gives way to the $\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu$ form and all Homeric differences are swept away, so in later Greek $\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu$ is found in place of $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ before the indicative, and even intrudes into the sphere of the simple $\acute{\alpha}\nu$. $\delta\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu$ is used for $\delta\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu$; $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ with subjunctive usurps the place of $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ with infinitive; $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ η runs riot. We say to ourselves, 'Chaos and Old Night. There are no problems of Greek syntax possible. We are in the realm of Solecism'. But that is not true. Language remains organic. The laws of the death are the laws of the life. De-organization is unravelling and the unweaving teaches us the weaving.

Here I made a provisional end nine years ago; and I have little desire to continue the plea for the kind of studies to which I have for so many years been addicted. That I am not altogether a stranger to the problems of genetic syntax, that I too have occupied myself somewhat with the histology of speech, that my formulae are the results of a study of the living forces of language and not mere convenient summaries of phenomena, I do not care to show in detail. My reward has been the contemplation of the beautiful workings of the beautiful language to which so much of my life has been given up, and so far as human approval is concerned let it be said at the last: Vaghiagli il lungo studio e il grande amore.

ADDENDUM.¹

The participle is not a mood but it is susceptible of modal relations, and the future tense of it is almost wholly modal, is almost wholly final. But when we first meet the participle, it has only the capabilities of the modal life which it afterwards developed. When we first find it, it is an adjective *plus* tense and clings to its substantive like a skin. True, it is not the tight skin of man or woman, but rather the loose skin of lion or tiger. Still, it will not come off and in fact never comes off; and this is our difficulty in dealing with the Greek participle. We too have a participle, and, under Latin influences, under French influences, our participle has acquired much of the mobility of the classic tongues.² And yet we feel distinctly when the line is overstepped, as it is overstepped by Milton, whose syntax is unnaturally close to his antique models, and who uses the participle, especially in its absolute form, with the utmost freedom. When he says,

Doth God exact day-labour, light denied ?

we understand perfectly, we understand immediately, we do not stop to ask whether he means 'when light is denied', 'if light be denied', 'though light be denied', but, after all, analysis would be more natural to us, and we are not satisfied to state relations so concretely as they appear in participial compression, to say nothing of the lumbering form of our perfect participle active, which can not vie with the Greek aorist in lightness and which is too stiff for conversational purposes. When, therefore, we attack the Greek participle in translation, actual or mental, we are apt to bring to bear a number of logical categories, causal, adversative, concessive, conditional, what not. Now the early Greek did not analyze as we analyze, and the Homeric grammarian is right

¹ To be inserted p. 132, l. 16 from bottom after 'μή with the participle'. By some mischance the section on the participle which was to have followed the treatment of the infinitive in this little series went astray. But the demands of the press are remorseless and I consoled myself by thinking that the subject had been fairly covered by my elaborate article in Vol. IX of the Journal and by my remarks in the Introduction to Pindar. So the printing went on without the section. However, on my return to Baltimore the missing MS turned up and it may possibly be worth the space which is given to it here.

² Nothing could be more exotic than Caxton's participialities. His *Eneydos* (1490) begins thus: After dyverse werkes made, translated and achieved, having no werke in hande, I sitting in my studye whereas lay many dyvers paunflettis and bookes, happened that to my hande cam a lytyl booke in Frenshe. (Kellner.)

when he implies that it is a mistake grammatically to sort Homeric participles into categories.¹ There is but one category, the temporal. All else is inference. And the same thing is generally true of Pindar (see I. E. cx), though it is in Pindar that we find a portentous advance. But the beginnings of analysis are there. The causal may still be merged in the temporal, but *καί—περ* in Homer, *καίπερ* in Pindar, is made to bring out the adversative element, though even that is mainly left to circumstance. There is nothing, however, to force the conditional. There is no *μή* with the participle in Homer, after the fashion so familiar to us in post-Homeric Greek, and, with the assumption of *μή*, the participle enters upon a new and more conscious life. The addition of *μή* to the participle marks a new era in the history of the language. It affects participle and negative alike. The participle is more conscious of its resources, and *μή* extends its empire. The negative of will becomes the negative of idea. *τὸ μή* with the infinitive had the imperative note to begin with, but in *ὁ μή* with the participle the imperative note is fainter. It merely echoes the *μή* of the conditional sentence, and the *μή* of the logical condition seems to be an intruder.²

B. L. G.

¹ Vögrin says briefly emphatically (S. 278): Die 'Auflösungen' der Partizipien sind *rein logische Operationen*. See also Bolling, l. c., p. 426.

² In the first part of this series a few typographical errors and other slips have been noted. Most of them correct themselves, such as p. 23 l. 3 from bottom 'phenomena' for 'phenomenon', p. 25 l. 6 from bottom 'department for 'departments,' 'Calf-skin' for 'calf's skin', p. 18 l. 8 from top, is a slip of the pen about which a page might be written. More serious is p. 20 l. 17 from top where for 'case of verbs' read 'case of doubt.' The Latin example p. 8 l. 8 from top is not apposite and should be omitted. P. 17 l. 3 from bottom cite: R. S. Radford, Personification and the Use of Abstract Subjects in the Attic Orators and Thukydides, J. H. U. Diss. just published though referred to in A. J. P. XX 111.